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Abstract
In this paper we investigate how the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining
solution respond to a change in the disagreement point d. We call a bazgaining
solution locally strong d-monotonic at the disagreement point d if an infinitesimal
increase of d;, while for each j~ i, d~ remains constant, then dgent i is the
only one who's payoff increases. We present sufficient conditions for the Pareto
frontier under which the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solution satisfy
this property. It turns out that in general the local strong d-monotonicity property
of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is a stronger requirement than that of the Nash
bargaining solution.
1 Introduction
Thomson investigated in [8] how three well-known bargaining solutions, NB, the Nash
bargaining solution [5], KS, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [4] and the egalitarian so-
lution [3] respond to certain changes in the disagreement point d for a fixed feasible
set. He shows for a general class of N-person bargaining problems that all three solu-
tions satisfy the d-monotonicity property. This property states that, given some agent
i, if d; increases while d~ remains constant for all j ~ i then agent i's payoff increases
(or at least not decreases). The stronger requirement, that not only agent i's payoff
does not decrease but also the payoffs of none of the other agents increases is called
strong cl-rrtonotonicity. For this general class of bargaining problems Thomson shows
that strong d-monotonicity only holds for the Egalitarian solution. Both, for the NB
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1and KS-solution, a counterexample is given.
'I'his notion of strong d-monotonicity is a global property in the sense that this property
should hold for every positive increment of d; at every threatpoint d.
In fact it is also interesting to see under which conditions for a fixed d this property
holds locally. That is, to see what the gains~losses will be for the other players if one
(arbitrarily chosen) player unilaterally changes his threatpoint something. If this player
is the only one who gains frorn such a small (positive) deviation we call the bargaining
solution local strong d-monotonic at the threatpoint d. Given the threatpoint d and the
corresponding bargaining point, this notion tells us something about the stability of the
realized bargaining point. This, in the following sense. If the bargaining point is local
strong d-monotonic at d then whenever one player likes to deviate from his threatpoint
unilaterally, this action will be disapproved by all other players. So, the player who
likes to change his threatpoint has to have rather good reasons before he will suggest to
reopen the bargaining process. This, in contrast to the case that such a change in the
threatpoint is benefitia} for some other player(s) too. In that case it is rational for that
(those) other player(s), at least, to be not against such a change in the threatpoint. So,
a less number of players will be against a reopening of the bargaining process in such
a case. In this sense, the threshold to reopen the bargaining process will be lower, and
the bargaining point is called less stable. Note that one may expect that coalitions will
be formed under these conditions. Thomson argues in [8], under such conditions the
eventual acceptance of the compromise value will be less likely. Information on local
d-monotonicity at the disagreement point in general will tell us, therefore, somethïng
about the realizability of the bargaining point.
In this paper we investigate those bargaining problems where the Pareto frontier can
be described by a srnooth strictly concave furrction. This class of problems (for larger
classes of bargaining problems, see e.g., [6] or [9]) is particular popular in applied eco-
nomic sciences (see e.g. the literature on policy coordination [2], [7], [10], [1]). For this
class of problems we show that in case the Pareto frontier is rather "flat" then both the
Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS-solution) and Nash bargaining (NB-solution) solution are local
strong d-rnonotonic at every threatpoint, which implies that for those frontiers both
solutions are even strong d-monotonic. Under those conditions there are therefore no
reasons to expect, a priori difficulties whether these solution can be realized, whatever the
threatpoint will be. However, in case the frontier is less "flat", e.g. if it is described by a
Cobb-Douglas function, then the local strong d-monotonicity property does not hold any
longer at every threatpoint for the KS- solution. This, in contrast to the NB-solution
which, as we will see, still (under some mild conditions) has this property. So, from
this point of view one might cautiously conclude that generally the realizibality of the
Nasli-bargaining solution will be enhanced over the Kalai-Smorodinsky one.
In fact, we will first present general formulas on how both compromise values react on
a change in the threatpoint before considering the specific local strong d-monotonicity
case. These general formulas are also interesting on their own.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two we present some preliminaries. Then,
in section three we consider the local strong d-monotonicity of the KS-solution for the
23-person case. In its first subsection we present a sufficient condition on the shape of
the Pareto-frontier, under which this property holds. [n the second subsection we treat
two examples not satisfying the sufficient shape condition. In case the Pareto-frontier
is described by a quadratic function it turns out that the KS-solution is local strong
d-monotonic at every threatpoint, whereas for a Cobb-douglas function in general the
local strong d-monotonicity property does not hold. In section four we consider the same
issues, but now w.r.t. the NB-solution. The general N-person case is discussed in section
five. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Following Thomson, we define an N-person bargaining problem to be a pair ( S, d), where
S C IItN is called the feasible set, IRN the utility space and d the disagreement point. If
the agents unanimously agree on a point J E S, they obtain J. Otherwise, they obtain
d. In this paper we are interested in the effect of changes in the disagreement point on
the point of agreement for a fixed feasibility set. Therefore, we will be considering not
just one single bargaining problem but a whole class of bargaining problems obtained by
varying the threatpoint. So it is natural to consider the next notion of solution for a class
of bargaining problems. Given a class of N-person bargaining problems, a solution is a
function F' associating with every (S, d) in this class the point of agreement F(S, d) E S.
Note that, since we will consider here a fixed feasibility set, the dependence of F on
S carr be omitted. F is called the Nash solution if for every fixed (S,d), F(S,d) is
assigned the point where the product II(J; - d;) is maximized for J E S with J 1 d
(here we use the vector inequality notation); F is called the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
ii for every fixed (S, d), F(S, d) is assigned the maximal point of S on the segment
connecting the disagreement point d and the so-called ideal point J~(S,d), where for
each i J;(S,d) :- max{J;~J E S;J ? d}.
Thomson considers two classes of bargaining problems: 1) EN, where the feasibility set
S is assumed to be convex, compact and such that there exists a J E S with J 1 d;
and 2) EN, which is a subclass of EN, the so-called class of comprehensive bargaining
problems. This subclass is obtained by considering just those elements in S satisfying
the additional property that whenever J E S and d G J G J, then J E S.
We will consider in this paper a subclass EP of EN. We assume that the (fixed) feasibility
set in tlris subclass ~;P satisfies the additional requirement that the set of (weak) Pareto
optimal solutions can be described by a smooth strictly concave function.
The property of local strong d-monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point d is
formulated as follows:
Definitian: If, for a fixed (S,d), aFa(ss'd~ G 0 for all j ~ i, and aad'd ~ 0, then the
bargaining solution F(S,d) is called tocat strong d-monolonic at d.
3Note that the counterexamples given by Thomson can be approximated arbitrarily close
by a bargaining problem from our class E~. So, using continuity arguments, it is clear
that the NB-solution and the KS-solution wíll not satisfy strong d-monotonicity for this
particular class too if N~ 2. On the other hand it is obvious that the local strong
d-monotonicity requirement does hold for both outcomes for the two-player case, for an
arbitrarily chosen threatpoint.
Another remark concerns the interpretation of the matrix DF(S, d) with entries the
partial derivatives a áás'd~. Assume that the set S is fixed, and that the compromisc
value F(S, d) is a differentiable function of d. Then, neglecting higher order derivatives
we have that in the neighbourhood of the threatpoint do, this compromise value can be
approximated by
F(S, d) - F(S, do) f DF(S, do)(d - do).
3 The KS-solution: 3-person case
Let J~ -(J~JZJ3) represent the ideal point, Jh'S - (JxsJ2SJ3S) the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution and P be the set of Pareto optimal solutions that can be rep-
resented by a twice differentiable, decreasing, strictly concave function. That is, to be
more precisely, assume that there exists a twice differentiable function y~ such that each
pair (Ji, Jz, J3) E P, tan be written as J~ - y~(J„J1), where all partial derivatives of ;~,
denoted in the sequel by y~~, are negative and the hessian of ep, y~~~, is negative definite.
The KS-solution can now be derived from the equations:




` d, d3 - J3 ` i~(Jl S, J2 S) J
where the ideal point J~ -(J~, JZ , J3 ) is determined by:
ds - 4~(Ji , ds), or - ds -f- y~(Ji , ds) - ~,
ds - S~(di, Js), or - d3 f S~(d~, Jz)- ~,
J3 - S~Ídi, dz).
(1)
Since y~; c O,i - 1,2 it is easily verified, using the implicit function theorem, that these
equations imply that Ji and JZ are implicitly given by a function of (d~, d2i d3). Suppose
that
~ Jz ~ - ~ .f~ (~r, dz, ds) ~ - .f(d~, dz, ds),
Ïs( i dz, da)
Then, according the implicit function theorem,
a(Ji,Ji) aÍ - r fi -~(Ji,ds) ,~~,(Ji,dz)
a~di, dz. ds) - a(di, ds, ds) I` -~(dr, Jf) p '-(d Jf) ~C', 2 ~~, r ~ ~
(2)





Therefore, J~.s, Jz s are implicitly determined by:
h'S
J~.s - di - J~(d~ - Ji)- ~
Jz s-dz-'d~~(dz-Jz)-~
or, substituting the formulas for J3s, J~ and J2:
9~ :- Jhs - d~ ~ d~-~v(~~S.rz'S)(di
- f~(di,dz,d3)) - ~ ~ d,-~p(d,,dz)
9z - J~ s- dz ~ d~~
w(v(d,, z)5)(dz - fz(di, dz, ds)) - ~
(3)
1'o show that g:- (g~,qz) determines implicitly (J~`~s,J2s) as a function of (dl,dzid3),
consider
a(9i,9z) ~(9i,9z) l
J' ~- d(Ji S,Jz sYa(d~,dz,d~)I
Using the following notation,
d; - J,! d; - J"~s
I` ~- d3 - J~' h ` ~- d J~ 3 3 - 3
for i- 1,'L, 3, we gct from (3) that
i ~ Jns Jh's)
a( J~c.~,~9Jz~.~s) - ~ o)-(~z ) 4~ ( i , z
where y:- (y~'~ ~'z) is Lhe Jacobian of c,~, and a(d,az,d,) -
-I f lí~(1 f~iV~i(di,dz)) ~~s(~ (.~i,dz) f ~~4~`z(di,dz)) I~ - 1~3(h t
( f~s(~ (d~,~z) t ~z~`~(d~,dz)) -l ~- 1~3(1 f Iz~'z(d~,dz)) Iz - 1~3(12 -~ z





1 f 1,4~i(di,dz) ~(Ji,dz) f li4~~z(di,dz) -(]i f ~, t~d~l)
` w (d~,Js) t Iz4~~(di,dz) 1 f Iz~z(di,dz) -(!z f,~) ). v z( ,, ~ 1
Now, since (4) is always non-singular, we can use the implicit function theorem to con-
clude that
ó(Jhs,J.is) - 8g }-,{ 8g }
a(di,dz,d3) -{a(Ji s,Jz s) a(di,dz,d3)
where the inverse of the matrix in (4) is:
(6)
{ 8g }-, - 1 0 } 1 !,
5~(Jns Jhs)
8(J~s, Jz~s) - 0 1 det Iz ~' z
and det, the determinant of al~~~~s), equals 1-{l,y~, f Izy~'z}(J~-s,Jz~s)
, .z
To complete the picture of aád5 we still have to consider aá. Since J3.s - c,x(Jr`.s J~.s) ~ ,
we have that
a~Ks 1
~ad s- ~ 4~~i(Jtis, Jzs) 4~z(J~ s, Jz s) ~~ a~ I.
~ ` 8d~ J
1 ~ l
Now, let L:- 0 1 I{at~~~}-~. Using (6) it is then easily verified that
4~~ S~z J
a(J~~S,J~-S,J3~S)
8(d,,dz,da) - -L{E f K3V}. (7)
~ 1 - lzS~~z liV~~z
~
!14oreover, elementary calculation shows that L- d~~ lzrá, 1- l~y~, , where
S~i 4~z
all partial derivatives y~'; are taken at (JÍ~s J~~s) This yields our first conclusion:
Theorem 1:
Under the stated assumptions on the Pareto frontier, the KS-solution is local strong
d-monotonic if and only if matrix -L{E f K3V} has the following sign-matrix:
f - l
- f - I.
--fl
Notc that since matrix L is not full rank, the kernel of this matrix is always nontrivial.
We will next show that the diagonal entries of the above matrix have always the appropri-
ate sign (i.e. are always positive), this, irrespective of the choice of the threatpoint d. To
6show this, we reconsider the factorization of a(d,d,,d,) ~n (5). 'I'he following factorization
is also possible
8g
a(di, dz, da) - h3Ez
-~ l~z,
where
r Ii4~i(di,dz) ~i4~~z(di,dz) -~a',( -~Tj ~
Ez - I` ~z4~'i(di, dz) ~z4~~z(di, dz) -,-' r-
v z(d,.~z )
and
-1 f K3 h3~ (J;,dz) 1~(1 - Ks)
Yz - ka~(di,Já) -1 ~- K3 1z(f - K3) )
Following the previous analysis we then have that
a(~~`s~'-s~'S)
--L{ti3Ez f Yz}. a(d,,da,d,)
1'his can be rewritten as
~i4~~r(di,ds) ji5~~z(di,dz) -( 1 - Iz)ai - I,az l
-h3 Ix4~~i(di,dz) Iz4~~z(di,dz) -Izai - (1 - 1,)az I - GYz, (8) det J
y~~(d,,dz)(1 -det) c,~'z(d,,d2)(1 - det) -a~ -az
where we used for simplicity of notation,




az ~- S~'z(di, J~)
We will now consider the sign-matrix of the different matrices that appear in (8).
Thereto, we first note that ~ equals the slope of the line connecting the points (Ji , dzi d3)
and (d1i dz, J3)(a similar remark holds w.r.t. ~~ ). So, the following inequalities
hold: ~, ( -~T G h G~, (d~dj). From this immediately the next inequalities result:
1 f I;c~';(d,,dz) 1 0, !, ~~, ( ~d 1 0 and Iz f~,l(~ ~ 0. Furthermore, we have that
K3 satisfies 0 G Ka C 1 and I; ~ 0. Using this, we see that in (8) the sign-structure is
as follows:
-`-f- f ? )-(} })
By elaborating this sign scheme, we see that the sign of the diagonal entries of matrix a(Jhs'~' S'~',S)
a[e always positive (independent of the choice of the threatpoint d). This a(d,,d,,d,)
result is in line with the result of Thomson, i.e.,
Corollary 2:
The I~S-solution satisfies d-monotonicity.
Now, recousider the representation (7) for the partial derivatives of Jr`S w.r.t. d;. It
t
is easily verified that the sign scheme for matrix L is - f l. Furthermore, since
7~; C 0 and 0 G K~ G 1, the sign scheme of E~- K3V is ~- ?1 }~. Here ?~ de-
- `?z - ~-
notes the sign of ~(J~,dz) -~ I~y~z(dl,dz), and ?z the sign of ~(d~,Jz) f Izy~'1(d~,dz),
which are both indetermined. Now, consider a~. From (5) and (7) we have that
?21
this derivative equals ái~~1 0)-}. e,~'z ~-Iz 1~ ~~ ad' Elementary calculation
asz
aa,
shows that this derivative can be rewritten as á i { ád -} K3y~z(Jr`-s, J~ ~s)h}, where h:-
h5
~, ~~-} ~,j(~. Similarly it can be shown that aá~ -~~{~-K3y~~(J~.s, J~.s)h}.
Using this and the stated result from corollary 2, we have that (see (7))
a( J~-s J~s J3.s) f --?i - t?a
~ ? 1 O signum a(d~, dz, ds) - --.z -1- -- 3 J, 9
where ?3 denotes the sign of h.
From this sign scheme we observe that if all entries denoted with an "?" are zero, then
the KS-solution will be local strong d-monotonic, whereas if this is not the case it be-
comes dubious whether this monotonicity property will hold. In any case it is clear that
to investigate whether the KS-solution will be local strong d-monotonic we only have to
verify the sign of three partial derivatives. This, since if e.g. the sign of ?1 is negative,
hS
it is clear from the above sign matrix that the sign of aádL will be negative too. So, it
suffices in that case to verify in the second column of this sign matrix only the sign of
hS
the first entry a~. We like to emphasize the following result:
Theorem 3:
It the next equalities hold,
i) ~ (Ji,dz) f 1i4~~z(di,dz) - fi,
ii) ~(di, Js) t IzS~~i(di, dz) - fi,
iii) ~,~,(~ } ,~~z(~ - 0,
then the KS-solution is local strong d-monotonic.
Of course the strength of this theorem lies in the facts that, first, the above condu-
sion continues to hold in case these equalities are approximately satisfied and, second,
the presented conditions are independent of the location of the KS-point.
As a special case, we consider the case that y~ represents a plane. From our previous
analysis then immediately the following equalities follow: ~, (~d 1- 1~ -~, (di,dal. As
a result we have that all equalities in the above theorem are satisfied. A more close
analysis in fact shows that matrix V in (7) equals the zero matrix. Substitution of this
into, and next spelling out of, (7) gives then that
~( Jr~s Jxs ~a~s) 1 1- Iz~z ~i4~~z -li
a(di, dz, da) - det ~z4~i I- hrp'i - Iz ~ (10)
4~i 4~z -(~iV'~~ f ~zV~z)
-t?z -f?i f
8where all partial derivatives are taken again at (J~ S, J2 S). From this it is easily verified
that the sign-matrix of this matrix does not depend on the choice of the threatpoint d.
So, we conclude that
Corollary 4:
The KS-solution is strong d-monotonic in case the Pareto-frontier is described by a plane.
Another example of a situation in which the conditions of theorem 3 are satisfied is
ií the Pareto frontier is represented by the quadratic function y~(x, y) - r-~ax2 - 26y2,
where r,a, 6 are some positive constants. With d - (0, 0, 0) it is easily verified that the
first two conditions of theorem 3 are satisfied. To verify the third condition, we note that
h- ~}, and Iz - ~. Using the facts that Ji -~ and Jz -~, direct substitution of
this into the third condition shows that this one is also satisfied. So, the KS-solution is
local strong d-monotonic at d-(0, 0, 0) for this quadratic function.
3.1 Two examples
In this subsection we first elaborate the quadratic case by which we concluded the previ-
ous sectiw~ iu some more gcnerality and show that the KS-snh~tinn is strong d-monotonic
for that particular case.
Example 5:
Let ep be represented by the quadratic function e,~(x) - r f bTx ~- zxTAx, where 6, x are
two-dimensional vectors, A is a negative definite 2x2 diagonal matrix and all entries of
b are negative.
Then, ~'t(x) -(bT -~ xTA) ~ Q~ and c~'Z(x) -(6T t xTA) I ~ I. Before we consider
the different entries of (7) w`e first note that for this particul`ar ease K3 c z. Without
going into mathematical details we note that this can be shown by substitution of the
relation J~`~S -(1 - Ií3)d t Ií3Jf into the equation Jás- c,~(Jh.s J2 s) This gives a
quadratic equation in K3 from which, aíter some tedious calculation, the inequality can
be verified.
Due to the facts that A is diagonal and ~, 1 -~-'d G I~ it is easily verified that
~(J~, d~) ~ I~c,~~(dl, d~) G 0. So, (see (9)) a~ C 0. Next, consider eá. Using
the notation P:- ~1 - I~y~'~(J~.S,J~S)~ K3~ (d~,Jz), we have from (7) that
~3J"~s -1
dd - det {F } Is(ti3 - 1)4~i(JKS Jz S) f Istis4~~(di, ds)}
~
- det
{P~- !2(K3-1)(6T-bJ~`STA)~ ~ ~.}12K3(bT fdTA)I 0 ~}
9det
{ P f Ix(ti, - 1)(bT f(d f K3(Jr - d))A) ~ ~~ f Izti3(bT t dT A) ~ ~~}
- det
{P f 12(2K3 - 1)(bT f dTA) ( 0~- I2h3Í1 - K3)(Jr - d)T A~ 0~}
G 0. `
Using the same arguments it can be shown that also both e ádi and a~ are negative.
hS
Finally, consider the partial derivatives ai. Under the assumption that h :- ~, ~~ f
~,z~ á~ G 0, we have from (9) that ad G 0. Furthermore, we can rewrite e-áá as:
BJ,~s -1
{I (1 - K K 4~ ~(J~s J~ s) k3 4~i(J~,s J2 s)
ad3 - det ~ 3- 3 4~'i(Ji,dx) )- 4~~z(di,Js) } A3I~ S~~z(di,Js)
}.
Elementary calculation shows that `''lJ~ G 1, which immediatel im lies that w'~(J,,d,) y p
a~ G 0. Obviously, the same arguments can be used to show that the partial deriva-
tives have the appropriate sign in case h~ 0.
So, we conclude that under these conditions, the KS-solution is strong d-monotonic.
The previous example illustrated that in general the conditions presented in theorem
3 are not sufHcient. Next we will consider another type of Pareto function which often
occurs in ecnnnmir. literature and which in general does not satisfy the local strong d-
monotonicity property.
Example 6:
Assume that the Pareto frontier is described by the Cobb-douglas function y~(x, y) -
(a - x)(b - y), where a, 6 are some positive constants. Moreover, assume that the
threatpoint d is the origin (0,0,0). (Note that in principle this choice is not correct
if we want to use our theory since we get problems when using the implicit theorem.
However, it is not difficult to show that by choosing d-(0, 0, d3) for a very small d3i we
get approximately the formulas stated below. Therefore, for the sake of easy exposition
we take d to be the origin).
It is now easily verified that, J~ - a, J~ - b, J3 - ab and Jh.s - K3J~, i- 1, 2, 3.
So, h -~ and IZ - a. Furthermore, c~~(a, y) - z~ aT'r and c,~2(x, y) - 2~ 6r'y . In
L
particular we obtain that c,~1(Jh.s Jz~s) - Z~ á and cp'2(J~~s, JZ~s) - 2' 6.
Now, consider 3ádz . From ( 7) we have that
8d~s - det{(1
- Iz4~x)ks I~,~(Ji,dz) f j~~z(d~,dz)~ f 1i4~i (- 1 t ti3(1 f I~V~s(di,dx)))}
-1 6-1 ~ ~ a r ~~ a-1 ~~ a ~~ a-1 b 6-1 ~ ~ a
det{(1- a2 Vb)h3`0}Vb2 VbItV62~(-1-FK3(1-1-~2V6))}
det{ a361~3t 21(-i~2x,)}
]oNow, since lí3 ~ 3(see e.g. 'fhomson (1987)), it is clear that there exist choices of a
and 6 such that y~ is not local strong d-monotonic at the origin.
4 The Nash bargaining solution: 3-person case
Since, by assumption, J3 - y~(Jt, J2) the Nash bargaining solution JNB .-
(JivB Jz B J3B) is determined by the argument that solves the maximization problem
max(J, - d,)(J2 - á2)(4~(Jt, J2) - da)
J~.~s
This maximization problem has, according to Nash, exactly one solution. Obviously,
this solution lies not on the edge of P, i.e., it is an internal element of P. Thus, the first
order conditions yield that the Nash bargaining solution is uniquely determined by:
4~(JiB,JzB)-d3 -FS~t(JiB-dt)-~ (11)
S~(JNB JsB) - ds t S~2(JsB- d2) - ~. (12)
rurthermore, using the shorthand tt~tatiun P:- {y'2 f~"12(JNB -- d,)}(Jz B- d2) -~
~(JNB JZB) - d3 } y~ t( INe - d,), the second order conditions give that matrix:
r(24~t f~G~~11(JiB- d,))(JsB- d2) P 1
` P (24~2 f 5~~~22(JzB- d2))(JNB - d, ) J
is semi-negative definite.
Using the first order conditions, we can rewrite this matrix as
H :- (25~~1 f 4~"11(J'vB - dt))(Jive - d2) ((5~~2 f `~ „2(J NB
-d'))(JYNB -d2) l
- (4~ t f i~ 21(Jz d2))(`~l dt) l2~ z f~i 2Z(`~z d2))(`~~ dt) J
Next, we follow the same procedure as in the proof of the Kalai Smorodinsky solution.
That is, consider
91 - ~(JNB
J2'B) - d3 } ~i'( JNB
- dt ) - ~
92 -S~(JiB,Jz B)-d3-~y~'2(Jz B-dz)-~
Let g :- (g, g2)T. Then,
~g 2~~t
}~~~it(Ji B- d,) 4~~2 t 4~~12(JiB- dt)
C) .INR JNB - i u JNB - d 2' n JNB - d ~. (13)
( 1 ~ 2 ) ~ 1}~ 2t( 2 2) ~ 2}~ 22( 2 2)
Now, suppose that H is invertible (which is of course generically true). Then, from the
negative-definiteness of H, we have that the determinant of N is positive. Straightforward
11calculations show then that also the determinant of the above matrix in (13), which we
will denote by det, is positive. So, we can use the implicit function theorem to conclude
that g implicitly defines (J~B, JzB) as a function of (dl, dzi d3) and that the derivative
of this function is given by
; B 2B 8(J J ) - -{
NBg NB } '{ ag }. (14)
a(d~,dz,d3) - a(J~ ,Jz ) a(d~,dz,d3)
It is easily verified that
8g -y~'~ 0 1
a(d~,dz,d3) - 0 -~z -1
(15)
and, using (13),
{ ag }-i - 1~ 24~~z f 4~~~zz(J~B- dz) -4~~z -~~~iz(JiB- di ) 1.
ó(J~B,JZ B) det -4~i-4~~n(Js B-dz) 2cPif4~~ii(JiB-dl) J (16)
To complete the picture of aáwe still have to consider aáá. Like for the KS-solution
this is achieved by noting that J3B- y~(JlB J~B) Consequently,
BJNB ( ~




! 1 0 ~




a(Ja(d~Jd2 d~ ) - -L{a( JNe9JzB)}-'{a(d~ad ,d3)},
(17)
where the entries can be calculated from (15) and (16), respectively, and all partial
derivatives are taken at the NB-point.
So, we have
Theorem 7:
Under the stated assumptions on the Pareto frontier and the assumption that matrix H
is negative definite, the NB-solution is local strong d-monotonic if and only if the above




For the same reason as in the KS-case, the above matrix is singular. As already men-
tioned in section 2 this observation is important in case one likes to construct a consistent
12path oí threatpoints leading to the compromise value.
a~xe
In particular note that, independent of the location of the threatpoint, always d ~
0, i- 1,2. By choosing a different parametrization of y~ it is easily verified that also
arNg
ád ) 0, which is in line with the d-monotonicity result of Thomson [S~
Corollary 8:
The NB-solution satisfies d-monotonicity.
From the first order conditions (11,12) we have that ep'~(JNB - d,) - y~ z(J~R- d2).
Using this, simple calculations show that
Theorem 7 (continued):
The NB-solution is local strong d-monotonic if and only if the next three inequalities are
satisfied at the NB-point:
i) -4~i- 4~~si(JzB- d~) ~ 0
ii) S~,S~z f(J2B - d2)(V~~i4~~~zs - 4~s4~~zi) ? 0
iii) 4~i4~s ~- (Jiie - d~ )(4~s4~
~r~ - V~~i4~~~si) ? 0
Note that always at least one of the above conditions is satisfied. Furthermore, we
immediately deduce from this theorem that
Theorem 9:
The NB-solution is strong d-monotonic if the following three conditions are satisfied:
i)~"z1G0
ii) 4~,4~~xx - 4~s4~~~s, ? 0
iii) 4~2~P~ii - S~i4~~2i ~ 0
Note that the above conditions are, e.g., satisfied if y~"z1 - 0. In particular this im-
plies that in case y~ is described by the quadratic surface as described in example 5, the
NB-solution is strong d-monotonic. Furthermore it is easily verified that in case e,~ is
described by the Cobb-Douglas function given in example 6, e~"~, - 4~. Obviously,
4~"21 ~ 0, so the conditions ii) and iii) oí theorem 9 are trivially satisfied. On the other
hand, we have that
-4~~~ - 4~~z~(JsB- ds) - 1 `~ - 1 JáB- dZ
2a-JiB 4 y~
- 2~{6-JZB-2(J2B-dz)}.
From the first order condition (12) we deduce that
2(JNB d ) - `''
- da (b - JNB) z - ~ ~ s
Substitution of this into the righthandside of the above expression shows that -y~'1 -
y~"z1(J2~ - dZ) is positive. Note that this is independent of the choice of the threatpoint
13d. So, we conclude from theorem 7 that for this example the NB-solution is strong d-
monotonic too. In fact a similar reasoning shows that this conclusion holds for a general
Cobb-Douglas function cp(x, y) -(a - x)a(6 - y)t-a.
5 The N-person case
The analysis of local strong d-monotonicity in the N-person case can be done along the
lines of the 3-player case. First, write for every Jt, ..., JN E P, JN - c~(Jr, ..., JN-1).
Next, we introduce the notation dpv :- (dt,..,d,v-1), J~N :- (Ji~..~Jtá-t)~ Jj,v --
(Jh.s JNSI) and dIN,; :- (dt,..,d;-t,J~ ,d;}1,..dN-1). Along the lines of section three
we first note that, since all partial derivatives of y~ are smaller than zero, we can apply
the irnplicit function theorem to conclude that J;,i - 1,..N - 1, can be viewed as a








-~ (dIN t) .. . -~~ -' (dlN,t) „'! (dlNa)
~ ... -"~~3(dIN.2) ,;,(dlNa)
I,
0 ,~ z (dIN,N) J
Ó.IKS
9JKS -I-~ : ~('i1(JIN )e...e~i N-1(JIN))i
( 1 ~ i N 1)
~N-1
where 1 is the identity matrix, we immediately see that this matrix is invertible and that
the inverse of this matrix equals:
Il
. ~~i~l(J,N ) ...
~~~N-1(JIN )) i






F'rom this, using the same arguments as in the 3-player case, it is then possible to cal-
a~h"S
culate 3á as E f KNV (see (5)) and next analyze ád . Here matrix E and V are given
by, respectively
It




V- ] f . ~~ t(d~.Nl,... S,~N-t(dlNl~ ~ .
-(Ó.h,..., JN-1)
~ a(di, ..., dN)
To analyze the general case for the NB-solution, we need a general expression for a~
(see (14)). It is easily verified that this derivative is given by the matrix
(I -F ones)diag(~i,...,4~N-i) -f- diag(JiVe - d~,...,JNB, - dN-i)4~~,
where'ones' denotes the matrix which entries are all 1, and diag is the shorthand notation
for diagonal matrix. Unfortunately, the inverse oí this matrix can not be calculated in
general as easily as in the KS-case, which complicates a more detailed analysis of this
case.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we introduced the notion of local strong d-monotonicity and studied how
this property can be examined for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solution
in detail. '1'he analysis was mainly performed in a 3-player context. For the general
N-player case we just indicated how these properties can be verified.
Though it is dif~icult to compare the conditions on the Pareto frontier under which the
KS-solution and the NB-solution are local strong d-monotonic, it seems that in general
this property will be more often satisfied by the NB-solution than by the KS-solution. In
particular we saw that in case the Pareto-frontier is represented by a quadratic surface,
both the NB and KS solution satisfy the local d-monotonicity property, whereas this is
not the case if the Pareto-frontier is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function. In the
latter case the KS-solution does not satisfy this property, in general, anymore. So, a
preliminary cautious conclusion may be that the NB solution in general seems to be
better realizable than the KS solution.
The performed analysis requires knowledge of the derivative of the bargaining solution
w.r.t. the threatpoint, which, in general, is singular.
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